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BOOK REVIEWS

LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW

by Norman St. John-Stevas
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1961. Pp. 375. $5.95.
Reviewed by
L. C. MCHUGH, S.J.*

Life, Death and the Law, by Norman St.
John-Stevas, a distinguished young British
legal authority and a Roman Catholic, addresses itself to the relationship between
morality and the law, particularly in the
United States and England.
This relationship, of course, is one of the
perennial problems of the jurist. Extreme
positivists tend to deny that there is any
relationship between civil law and traditional morality; they see in the law nothing
more than the will-to-power of the dictator
or the democratic majority. A religious reformer like Calvin, on the other hand, tends
to view the state itself as an organ that can
be forced to impose sectarian theological
precepts on the community. In between are
the rest of us, sure that morals have some
bearing on the law, but unsure to what extent the secular arm should command the
ethical good or, more especially, prohibit
moral evil.

Associate Editor of America, formerly a professor of ethics at Georgetown University in
Washington, D. C.

This problem has a peculiar urgency for
the conscientious Catholic lawyer in America. He has the duty of helping to shape
legal policy on a number of issues on which
the traditional moral judgment of the community, as well as its religious and political
leaders, seems to be suffering radical
change. Some of these areas of controversy
touch on the essential sanctities of life, like
the questions of encouraging contraception, liberalizing abortion or legalizing
euthanasia. What basic attitude is the
Catholic student of jurisprudence to take,
when apparently progressive social forces
demand legislative changes that ignore or
even reverse our established moral judgments on such matters?
Life, Death and the Law is a much
needed and significant contribution to the
debate on the relationship of law and morality that is winning increased attention
not only from lawyers, but from moralists
and theologians as well.
The book is built on a simple plan that
involves seven chapters and an array of
sixteen appendices.
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In the opening chapter, the author examines the positions of Protestants, Catholics and nonbelievers on the relation
between law and morals. In the remaining
chapters, he analyzes the major areas of
contemporary concern in the United States
and England: the control of conception,
artificial insemination, sterilization, homosexuality, suicide and euthanasia. In each
of these areas St. John-Stevas discusses the
historical background, submits the laws
now in the statute books to critical analysis,
weighs proposed changes in the laws and
offers some recommendations of his own.
The text is readable and understandable,
even for those who are not lawyers, and the
course of the argument is supported by an
extensive use of footnotes as well as by the
full appendices. The appendices, incidentally, are exceedingly valuable for anyone
who wishes to pursue the major theses of
the book further. One appendix, for example, summarizes the status of birth control
legislation in the United States. Another
cites the laws of the fifty States punishing
homosexual offenses. For the general student of the problems raised, the most valuable appendix will be the select bibliography
listing several hundred references to all
aspects of the relation between law and
morality.
I do not intend to discuss the treatment
given by St. John-Stevas to the individual
areas of controversy. I wish, however, to
call attention to what seems to be the most
important practical question raised in the
book:
Whatever the differences between Catholics and Protestants on the relationship
between Church and State, or law and
morals, they have a common interest that
the exercise of power should be regulated by
the moral order. Can some principle be
found acceptable to both, and possibly also

to secular liberals, which will mark out the
frontier between law and morals, and in
particular draw a line between morality and
the criminal law?'
The answer to this question forms the
essence of whatever contribution St. JohnStevas has to make to the current dialogue
on morals and the law. Let me therefore,
perhaps at the risk of some unfairness to
the author, summarize the working rule
which he proposes for resolving disputes
on the shaping of the law in democraticpluralistic societies such as our own.
The author says: "A working rule might
be that the majority should abstain from
obliging the minority to follow any practice which they condemn as immoral, provided abstention does not injure the
common good."' 2 Fraternity, therefore, together with its corollaries, liberty and
equality, require that the majority should
respect the conscientious convictions of
minorities, except where conformity with
the majority will is essential for the welfare
of the state.
I think a second working rule proposed
by St. John-Stevas would cover the problem of the Christian lawyer who seeks an
ally in the law to preserve the fabric of
society from agnostic corrosion and wholesale secularization. The Christian attempt
to preserve moral values in existing institutions is reasonable and understandable up to the point where the moral judgment
expressed by the law no longer has any
correspondence with the general view of
society. "Public enforcement of religious
standards cannot extend beyond the area
of community agreement."'3 Hence our ef1 ST. JOHN-STEvAs, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW
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forts to implement law should terminate
when we cease to have the backing of the
consensus of the community. Just as the
good of civil peace is a value which dictates the maximization of the conscientious
rights of minorities, so it also commends
that Catholics, for example, "exercize a
self-denying ordinance," and recognize that
some past moral judgments, such as the
condemnation of contraception, may have
to be treated as private judgments.
Fundamental to the development of
these positions of St. John-Stevas are several subsidiary theses, viz., that (1) good
theology is not necessarily good government; (2) that social policies with moral
implications are not laid down by fiat from
above but are evolved gradually through
the reflections of free men; and (3) the
view that the law is in practice expressive
of the collective conscience of the community on those matters that cannot be left to
individual choice.
Conceivably then, in a religiously pluralistic society such as ours, the role of the
Catholic lawyer might be to argue and to
persuade, but not to regard the natural law
as an absolute set of values that can be
forced upon an unbelieving and- unwilling
community. Perhaps, as the existing.moral
consensus of our people changes its view
on such things as the immoral character of
mercy killing or' the unacceptability of
homosexual "marriage," the best we can
hope for, as a religious minority, is that
the civil law will continue to reflect some
modest compliance with the dictates of objective morality in those matters that are
not only right and true, but wholly essential
to the pursuit of the public good, at least
as it is conceived in scholastic circles. For,
if St. John-Stevas is correct, the imposition
ground of Catholics, Protestants, Jews and
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police -power of the state, in the absence of
a community consensus on our own views
of morality, would lead to greater evils
than the ones we are intent on suppressing.
Undoubtedly, in Catholic circles, one can
see recent trends toward some such working
rule as that outlined in Life, Death and the
Law. This is especially true of the controversy over the Massachusetts and Connecticut birth-control statutes. These laws,
passed more than eighty years ago by Protestants, now find themselves defended by
Catholic influence, although the struggle is
not so much over the jurisprudential aspects of these Statutes, as over which of the
contending parties shall manifest dominant
power and prestige.
Writing in Look for October 10, 1961,
Fr. John A. O'Brien, research professor of
theology at Notre Dame University, argued
that "the time has come to take the birthcontrol issue out of politics, out of the field
of legislation, and confine it to the legitimate domain of conscience and religion."
With regard to the use of contraceptives in
the home, we are dealing not with public
crime but with sins done in privacy. Only
failure and anarchy would follow any serious effort to invade the home in order to
detect or forestall private lapses against the
law, especially in a matter where it cannot
be shown that the immoral act is an important hurt to the common good. Religion
itself, in the estimation of Fr. O'Brien,
would be the worst victim of the attempt
to force credal beliefs upon those who sincerely differ with us on the morality of
artificial birth control.
The working principle advocated by St.
John-Stevas, of course, recognizes the paramount character of the common good,
which is indeed the common meeting
of patterns of activity by sheer use of the
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secular humanists when they weigh the relations between morality and law. But, as
he would be the first to admit, it is very
difficult to find unanimity, or a general
consensus, on what moral elements are
properly or essentially constitutive of the
common good in civil society. The scope
and extent of such a consensus varies from
one society to another, and it is not something "given" for all time in a developing
and pluralistic society such as we find here
in America. The latter point is brought out
by the very question of contraception itself
- an issue whereon the community consensus has not only shifted drastically in
two generations, but has shown itself peculiarly responsive to doctrinal changes in
church teachings and to various other sociological factors. Not many years ago we
had a moral consensus, grounded in religious belief, that artificial birth control was
contrary to divine law, tended to the destruction of the family and population
decline, and hence touched gravely on the
common good (even though the practice
never became a matter of legislation generally). Today, Catholics stand almost
alone in their reprobation of contraception:
as for its other aspects, most non-Catholics
now regard the practice as a matter of
esthetics rather than morality, and many
of the clergy are beginning to say that encouragement of birth control is a positive
demand of the common good in the face of
the so-called population explosion.
There is a certain attractiveness in the
thought that the primacy of the common
good, in its aspects of fraternity, liberty and
equality, justifies the practical rule that the
moral consensus of the community may be
granted the role of principal determinant
of what should or should not be incorporated in the body of positive law. But it is

exceedingly hard to assess what are the
right prudential limits of the toleration of
moral evil when we insist (as Catholics do)
that the state as such, and independently of
any. moral consensus of its members, has a
true role from natural law as the promotor
and protector of objective moral values
that are indissoluble from any just appraisal of the common good. For it is clear
that the law does sometimes undertake to
educate, even in a democracy and where
there is an imperfect community consensus
at best. The recent history of the Supreme
Court in respect of racial segregation tends
to bear fhat out.
The question of the acceptable limits of
tolerating moral evil has grave poignancy
for the Catholic lawyer when he reflects on
the continual erosion of moral values in
American society. Will the day come when
our society becomes completely secularized?
Will the law, as a consequence, become as
dissociated from all moral commitments as
the government is neutral to all establishments of religion? And what will be the
ultimate shape of the common good, if it is
to be determined by a majority consensus
that has no ties to either God or natural
law? Can we accept the rule that a community consensus must determine the relation
between law and morals, if the end-product
is indistinguishable from sheer positivism
and the tyrannical rule of a secular
majority?
The erosion of moral values in America
was strongly emphasized in "Unchanging
Duty in a Changing World," the statement
issued by the Catholic Bishops of our country on November 19, 1961.
The Bishops noted that many of us are
questioning or even denying the distinction
between good and evil. "They are cutting
themselves off completely from moral tra-
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ditions. For the first time they find themselves without a moral law to break."
The erosion of moral values has a serious bearing on the nature of the consensus
within our society, and hence also on the
moral content of civil law and the form of
the common good. It is all very well to
argue that contraception, for instance, is a
private act, and that matters of this sort
may be removed from the field of public
policy because they belong primarily in the
arena of religion or individual morals. But
where are we to draw the distinction between what is tolerable and intolerable in
activities that have no apparent relation, or
only an indirect one, to the basic requirements of the public good? Suppose that
relaxed moral standards, plus the propaganda of interested parties, creates a climate that is favorable to homosexual
unions, and that, as a consequence, the
statutes of the states regarding such perversions are abrogated. Can our society
allow widespread practice of the vice that
characterized ancient Greece, without grave
harm to the most necessary ideals of family
life and monogamous marriage?
Or again, can we make any real contribution to the common good by permitting
lawyers, psychiatrists and sociologists to
enlarge the notion ol legalized therapeutic
abortion? There is already considerable agitation in this country for "abortions of
convenience." If any kind of direct abortion is actually a form of murder, can we
truly forward the good life of man on earth
by reverting to an invasion of life's sancti-
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ties that is properly characteristic of pagan
rather than Christian societies?
It would seem that no matter what may
be the moral consensus in communities,
there comes a point of toleration with respect to such aberrations where we begin
to deny the radical dignity and inviolability
of the human personality (e.g., in the legalization of euthanasia), and effectively
liquidate the most basic values that are
incorporated in the historical ethos of our
people and government.
I do not intend these objections as a
strong criticism of St. John-Stevas, nor as
a rejection of the working principle he has
offered in Life, Death and the Law. This
author has the great merit of having come
to grips with a thorny problem that
is afflicting modern pluralistic societies
wherein religious differences and even religious decline are creating a trend to secularize the law and finally divorce it from
all moral absolutes that bear on the common good. This is a trend that favors sheer
positivism in the law and encourages pure
relativism in morals. Neither aspect of the
trend can triumph without robbing the
common good of all objective moral constituents and leaving its definition to the
mercy of totalitarian planning boards or
the most dangerous passions of the majority. It is to be hoped that other Catholics, following the lead of Norman St.
John-Stevas, will now contribute to the
growing debate on law and morality, and
thus help to provide the human spirit with
optimum conditions of development in the
busy City of Man.'

